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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMPARATIVE LAW AS A CRITIQUE 
OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE!
Peer Zumbansen* 
Abstract: A project seeking to assert and contrast the ‘practice’ of comparative law in 
distinction from the well-known and longstanding theoretical critique of the field is 
itself in need to define the meaning of practice. The following chapter, written for a 
volume edited by Jacco Bomhoff and Maurice Adams, takes up this challenge in two 
steps. In a first one, it revisits comparative law’s seemingly eternal self-doubt 
regarding its target of inquiry and its method. I will suggest that there is a great 
promise for comparative legal studies in the context of transnational legal pluralism as 
a methodological approach to the study of intersecting normative and institutional 
orders. In a second step, I would like to draw out the context in which current debates 
about comparative and transnational law are unfolding. This context- ‘global 
governance’- poses significant challenges for the role of law in what has fast become 
a multi-disciplinary inquiry regarding the contours and foundations of a continuously 
evolving global regulatory landscape. A reflection on the regulatory aims of 
comparative law as transnational law, which I have been pursuing together with 
Russell Miller in ‘Comparative Law as Transnational Law: A Decade of the German 
Law Journal’ (Oxford University Press, 2012), can serve as a powerful critique of 
global governance.  
Keywords: comparative law, comparative constitutional law, practice, transnational 
law, constitutionalism 
JEL: K10, K33 
        Introduction 
In 1997, in a thoughtful and provocative article, Günter Frankenberg raised the 
question ‘Why Care’? in relation to the vivid debates concerning the uncertain future 
! This chapter takes up questions from a larger research inquiry into the methodology and prospects of 
comparative and transnational law. Parts draw and build on ideas addressed in the following essays: 
Carving out Typologies – Accounting for Differences across Systems: Towards a Methodology of 
Transnational Constitutionalism, in: Michel Rosenfeld and Andras Sajo (eds.), Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press, 2012 – forthcoming), ‘Varieties of 
Comparative and Global Constitutionalism: The Emergence of a Transnational Legal-Pluralist-Order’, 
in 1:1Global Constitutionalism (2012) – forthcoming, and ‘Neither ‘Public’ Nor ‘Private’, ‘National’ 
nor ‘International’: Transnational Corporate Governance from a Legal Pluralist Perspective’, 38:1 
Journal of Law and Society (2011), 50-75. I am grateful to Alexandra Kemmerer for a close and critical 
reading of this text. 
* Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada. 2011, Hanse Institute for Advanced
Study, (www.h-w-k.de). Email: PZumbansen@osgoode.yorku.ca. 
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and legacies of the welfare state.1 Take away a few years, consider a slight change in 
that title by adding three letters, and the question asked was: ‘Why Compare’?, an 
invitation to an inquiry, which has arguably been at the centre both of that very same 
scholar’s milestone article in 19852 and of the field’s very own self-assertion and 
introspection.3 Indeed, comparative lawyers have for more than one-hundred years 
sought to increase the understanding of ‘foreign’ legal orders and regulatory systems. 
Despite some never fully resolved methodological questions,4 great advances have 
been made in the comparative study of different regulatory areas both in ‘private’ 
(contract, tort, corporate, labor) and ‘public’ law (constitutional law, environmental 
law). These areas illustrate that comparative law is the opposite from l’art pour l’art. 
Quite to the contrary, comparative work in these realms has been occurring and 
progressing at particular moments in time. Scholars and practitioners have been 
looking to the particulars of a ‘foreign’ legal order in the awareness that there is 
something at stake and that a comparative perspective on a set of legal rules, 
principles or institutions would, ultimately, produce important insights not only into 
the differences and similarities of the compared legal cultures, but – more 
significantly – into the complex manner in which legal orders evolve. To the degree 
that the comparativist would ‘discover’ and ‘learn’ about the rules, institutions and 
legal routines in ‘foreign’ lands, she would most importantly find herself thrown back 
unto herself, confronted with her own idiosyncrasies, her background and ‘culture’, 
eventually becoming much less starry-eyed vis-à-vis her own legal system.5 Despite 
the persistence with which protagonists of comparative6 or ‘world’ law7 continued to 
make claims of law’s universal progress, doubt inevitably began to creep into an ever 
more elaborate edifice of comparative law, and not before long the well-meaning, yet 
ideologically naïve impetus of comparative law was aptly exposed and laid out for all 
to see.8 
Meanwhile, now at just over 110 years old, comparative law is not dead – or, 
is it?9 As an element of crucial importance in a system of considerably parochial 
national legal education,10 the value of comparative law can be and is often still 
highlighted with view to the graduating students’ need to ‘know more about the 
1 Günter Frankenberg, 'Why Care? - The Trouble with Social Rights', Cardozo Law Review, 17 (1996), 
1365-1390. 
2 Günter Frankenberg, 'Critical Comparisons: Re-Thinking Comparative Law', Harvard International 
Law Journal, 26 (1985), 411-455. 
3 Peer Zumbansen, 'Comparative Law's Coming of Age? Twenty Years after "Critical Comparisons''', 
German Law Journal 6 (2005), 1073-1084. 
4 For an excellent overview, see Ralf Michaels, 'The Functional Method in Comparative Law', in 
Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
5 Frankenberg, ‘Critical comparison’.  
6 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford University 
Press, 1996). 
7 Harold J. Berman, 'World Law', Fordham International Law Journal, 18 (1995), 1617-1622. 
8 Otto Kahn-Freund, 'On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law', Modern Law Review, 37 (1974), 1-
27; Jonathan Hill, 'Comparative Law, Law Reform and Legal Theory', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 
9 (1989),  101-115; Frankenberg, ‘Why care?’.  
9 But, see the sobering notes by Ralf Michaels, 'Im Westen nichts Neues?',  RabelsZ, 66 (2003),  97-115 
10 See the contributions to the 10th Anniversary German Law Journal Symposium on ‘The 
Transnationalization of Legal Cultures’, June-July 2009, 1291-1416, available at: 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/FullIssues/PDF_Vol_10_No_10_Complete%20Issue.pdf.  
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world’11 and to be better equipped to aptly move from one ‘secondment’ to the next.12 
And yet, comparative law in its own right is not on the rise in law school faculties 
around the world, surely not as a mandatory subject or, as such, in high demand from 
students. The last significant creation of a journal dedicated to the comparative study 
of law goes back to the initiative of a group of established legal scholars13 – quite the 
opposite from an innovative grass roots movement driven by the ‘next generation’. 
The question whether that can be solely accredited to the field’s never-ending 
methodological self-doubts14 or to the overwhelming influence of practitioner 
lobbying over law school curricula with view to include more practical training 
opportunities in the students’ legal education15 does not necessitate a satisfying or 
clear-cut answer. Legal education, for the time being, continues to struggle to build 
into daily taught subjects a genuinely comparative perspective, from which it would 
be possible for students to both contextualize and relativize what it is they are learning 
about the law in their own legal culture. 
This shortcoming is regrettable in that legal practice appears to ever more 
naturally be exposed to elements and trends arising from an evolving and increasingly 
interdependent transnational legal-pluralist order. The core trait of this emerging order 
is its ambiguous, nervous nature. Evolving out of a parallel and overlapping processes 
of state transformation, mostly in the ‘North’ and the ‘West’, and decolonization, 
consolidation and transition in the ‘South’, the emerging elements of normativity and 
of institutional order prompt a serious revisiting of comparative law’s traditional 
starting points. The questions of method remain inseparable from those concerning 
the politics and the ‘project’16 of any comparative undertaking. And, from that 
vantage point, a legal methodological introspection as has long been part of the 
‘fledgling’ discipline of comparative law,17 is inevitably further complicated by the 
fact that the jurisdictional reference points are themselves becoming less reliable as 
demarcating lines. Neither a nationally confined doctrinal instruction in the rules and 
methods of a particular field in a given country nor the, more often than not, relatively 
randomly chosen jurisdiction of comparison,18 can provide for an adequate training of 
the soon to graduate legal scholar – or practitioner.  
While law schools continue to struggle with the challenges of 
‘globalization’,19 the reality of a fast integrating world still raises the bar for such an 
11 Catherine Valcke, 'Global Law Teaching', Journal of Legal Education, 54 (2004), 160; Mathias 
Reimann, 'From the Law of Nations to Transnational Law: Why We Need a New Basic Course for the 
International Curriculum', Penn State International Law Review, 22 (2004), 397-415 
12 Roy T. Stuckey, 'Preparing Students to Practice Law: A Global Problem in Need of Global 
Solutions', South Texas Law Review, 43 (2002), 649. 
13 http://www.ejcl.org/. 
14 Annelise Riles, 'Introduction: The Projects of Comparison', in Annelise Riles (ed.), Rethinking the 
Masters of Comparative Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), p. 2: “…everyone is a methodologist – 
to be a comparativist today is to worry about the proper terms, categories, scale, methods, and data to 
be used in comparison.” 
15 See eg ‘Washington and Lee School of Law Announces Dramatic Third Year Reform’, 10 March 
2008, available at: http://law.wlu.edu/news/storydetail.asp?id=376. 
16 Annelise Riles, 'Introduction: The Projects of Comparison', in: Annelise Riles (ed.) Rethinking the 
Masters of Comparative Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001); see also Otto Kahn-Freund, 'On Uses 
and Misuses of Comparative Law', Modern Law Review, 37 (1974), 1-27. 
17 Riles, ‘The Projects of Comparison’, p. 6. 
18 In many cases going back to the personal acquaintances between scholars. 
19 Simon Chesterman, 'The Globalisation of Legal Education', Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 
(2008), 58-67; Craig Scott, 'A Core Curriculum for the Transnational Legal Education of JD and LLB 
Students: Surveying the Approach of the International, Comparative and Transnational Law Program at 
Osgoode Hall Law School', Penn State International Law Review, 23 (2005), 757-773. 
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endeavor significantly. Above all, this ‘reality’ reflects deep-running transformations 
of the normative and institutional regulatory landscape. Where comparative lawyers 
traditionally directed their gaze at the intricate histories of a nation’s legal culture, 
iterations and turning points in the hope to gain insights into the driving forces of 
evolving legal and political cultures,20 this process is today still more difficult in light 
of the relativization of jurisdictional boundaries as markers of rule-generating and –
administering spaces.21 What Philip Jessup, in 1956, identified as the emergence of 
‘Transnational Law’,22 today shows its face as a myriad web and ‘assemblage’23 of 
intertwining, both public and private, that is hybrid, forms of regulation that can no 
longer be easily associated with one particular country or, for that matter, one 
officially mandated rule making authority.24 The challenge arising from this 
transnational legal-pluralist order consists in making sense of different understandings 
of legal rule-making, legal pluralism and the role of political authority (eg the ‘state’) 
in the face of an increasingly fluid normative order.  
In the remainder of this chapter I will very briefly consider four areas situated 
in this ambiguous space between comparative law and transnational legal pluralism. 
In understanding these fields as having both a mediating and catalyzing function in 
provoking inquiries into the prospects of legal method under conditions of 
globalization, they offer valuable insights into the dynamics between theory and 
practice of ‘comparative’ law. The fields considered in the following are: comparative 
corporate governance; human rights law and legal anthropology; comparative 
constitutional law; and comparative administrative law through the lens of ‘Global 
Administrative Law’. 
Comparisons in a Transnational Legal-Pluralist Order 
The question that comparative lawyers have to ask themselves is how to adopt their 
analytical toolkit to the realities of a largely fragmented and incoherent regulatory 
landscape. The contours of the emerging multi-layered, pluralist regulatory 
architecture become visible through a closer look at some of the most dynamic legal 
regulatory areas today. In manifold fields of legal regulation, including contract,25 
tort,26 environmental27 or corporate law,28 we have been able to witness a remarkable 
20 Annelise Riles, 'Introduction: The Projects of Comparison', p. 11: ‘The comparative lawyer is a 
person who engages comparison for a purpose, in other words, whether it is to find a model for 
modernization, or to harmonize legal regimes.’ 
21 Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels and Annelise Riles, 'Transdisciplinary Conflict of Laws: Introduction', 
Law & Contemporary Problems, 71 (2008), 1-17. 
22 Philip C. Jessup, Transnational Law (Yale University Press, 1956). 
23 Saskia Sassen, Territory - Authority - Rights. From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton 
University Press, 2006); Marc Amstutz, 'In-Between Worlds: Marleasing and the Emergence of 
Interlegality in Legal Reasoning', European Law Journal, 11 (2005), 766-784. 
24 Larry Catá-Backer, Governance without Government: An Overview, in: G. Handl, J. Zekoll & P. 
Zumbansen (eds.), Beyond Territoriality: Transnational Legal Authority in an Age of Globalization 
(Brill, 2012 – forthcoming); Peer Zumbansen, 'Neither `Public' nor `Private', 50-75. 
25 W. Carl Kester, 'Governance, Contracting, and Investment Horizons: A Look at Japan and Germany', 
in Donald H. Chew (ed.) Studies in International Corporate Finance and Governance Systems. A 
Comparison of the U.S., Japan and Europe (Oxford University Press, 1997). 
26 Craig M. Scott, 'Introduction to Torture as Tort: From Sudan to Canada to Somalia', in Craig M. 
Scott (ed.) Torture as Tort (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001). 
27 Jutta Brunnée, 'Of Sense and Sensibility: Reflections on International Liability Regimes as Tools for 
Environmental Protection', International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 53 (2004), 351-367. 
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expansion of the outside boundaries of the respective fields to elements of 
comparison, integration and assimilation. This development goes far beyond the 
traditional zeal of comparative law, in that experts in a particular field now find 
themselves unavoidably confronted with a fast-changing regulatory and institutional 
landscape, the driving forces of which might have their origin within the particular 
legal culture or, more likely, result from a combination of elements of national and 
transnational regulatory evolution. In this space, it becomes obvious, that a natural 
part of legal research, case preparation and problem solving consists in integrating 
legal solutions, principles and rules from a variety of legal levels and cultures.29 At 
the same time, then, the significant challenge arises from the nature of the norms 
which are generated in these highly specialized areas. This observation applies to each 
of the four areas selected here. The following examples illustrate the particular 
dynamics of a transnational legal-pluralist order and the challenges they pose for a 
traditional methodology of law at a time, where the lively assertions of an era of 
‘global governance’ render the question of the king discipline ever more pressing. As 
‘legal’ regulation increasingly encompasses a variety of direct and indirect, hard and 
soft, public and private, domestic or global types of norms, standards, 
recommendations and guidelines, it becomes particularly difficult to gain a 
perspective from which to scrutinize what Annelise Riles identified as the ever-
present politics and project orientation of comparative law. The boundaries between 
distinctly perceived legal and political, jurisdictionally and systemically perceived 
systems begin to fade, while the contours of specialized, sectorial and functional 
regulatory regimes become more accentuated.30 In this process, different fields of law 
are becoming functionally differentiated in that they are asked to take on board the 
particular regulatory dynamics in a given regulatory area. The areas of law, which are 
highlighted in the following, are telling examples of how legal theory becomes 
intertwined with the multifaceted and complex notion – and reality – of global 
governance, which itself can only be unpacked from an interdisciplinary perspective. 
What might at first have appeared to the student as a concrete and relatively confined 
regulatory field – corporate governance, human rights, constitutional and 
administrative law – can now be seen as part of a larger conceptual and practical 
endeavor. For the student of comparative law, each of these fields holds the initial 
promise of explaining differences as well as similarities between what she might still 
identify as distinct, historically evolved legal cultures. A closer look, however reveals 
a regulatory thrust in each of these areas, which can only be scrutinized from a 
transnational perspective. Each of the studied ‘fields’ gives partial evidence of an 
emerging transnational regulatory landscape, which cannot exhaustively be explained 
from a traditional comparative perspective. The intricate coexistence of and the 
dynamics and tensions between different forms and levels of norms, as for example in 
the case of corporate governance today, illustrate the formation of a regulatory space, 
                                                                                                                                       
28 Klaus Jürgen Hopt, 'Comparative Company Law', in: Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann 
(eds.), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (2006); David C. Donald, 'Approaching Comparative 
Company Law', Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law, 14 (2008), 83-178. 
29 Antje Wiener, 'Contested Meanings of Norms: A Research Framework', Comparative European 
Politics, 5 (2007), 1-17, 2: ‘…under conditions of transnationalization the regulatory practices of 
modern constitutionalism are increasingly moved out of the social contexts of their modern i.e. 
Hegelian conception. Subsequently, interpretation of the principles and norms of governance depends 
increasingly on cultural practices.’ 
30 For the examples of transnational contract and corporate law, see Gralf-Peter Calliess and Peer 
Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code: A Theory of Transnational Private Law (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2010), ch. 3, ch. 4. 
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the confines of which are no longer congruent with jurisdictional borders. Similarly, 
the insights from legal anthropology into the ‘practice’ of human rights law31 suggest 
that we revisit a comparative perspective from which we would compare ‘different’ 
regulatory cultures. Of central relevance here is a legal pluralist and anthropological 
analysis of the ways in which human rights are identified, understood, invoked and 
implemented in very concrete settings.32 The last two examples, constitutional and 
administrative law, then, provide powerful insights into an evolving transnational 
regulatory landscape in that these two fields can be used as an initial toolkit with 
which to scrutinize both the forms (legality) and the aspirations (legitimacy) of 
emerging global governance institutions and practices.  
  
 
Comparative Corporate Governance: A Case in Point of a Transnational Legal 
Pluralist Order 
 
If there is a moment in time for comparative law, the moment to engage in 
comparative corporate law or, as the more recent, widely accepted parlance would 
have it, corporate governance, is not one, but a series in promptings to gaze across the 
fence. This gazing across the fence to identify and to understand the groundwork of 
another jurisdiction’s corporate law rules has regularly been provoked by the curiosity 
to find out what makes another country’s economy so successful. Corporate 
governance is widely understood to be an important part of a national economy’s 
DNA in that it negotiates and settles, consolidates and dynamisizes the rules of the 
game of business creation and commercial interaction. Corporate governance relates 
to the exercise of powers inside the business association, or firm: the analytical focus 
can, for one, be directed to the relationship between the owner (shareholder; principal) 
and the management (agent). Alternatively, one may focus on the overall 
organisational structure of the firm. While this also includes the principal-agent ties, it 
also encompasses the other ‘stakeholders’ in the firm, such as employees and 
creditors. The first, control-oriented approach centres on shareholders as the prime 
residual claimants of the firm: therefore, the firm’s organisation is governed by the 
overriding principle of maximizing ‘shareholder value’.33 The other, stakeholder 
oriented, approach considers the actors in and around the firm and its business with 
regard to their vested interests in the firm. It sees the firm as embedded in a specific 
legal, economic and political culture, herein playing a role as societal actor.34 In 
contrast to the shareholder approach, this perspective takes into account the public 
services rendered by a large firm in view of employment capacities and overall socio-
economic spin-off.35 
These two definitions lie at the base of a debate over different patterns of 
corporate organization, which was for the longest time driven by an almost 
overwhelming belief in what some recognized as nothing less than the ‘end of history 
                                                
31 See eg the contributions to Mark Goodale and Sally Engle Merry, The Practice of Human Rights: 
Tracking Law Between the Global and the Local (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
32 Richard Ashby Wilson, 'Afterword to “Anthropology and Human Rights in a New Key”: The Social 
Life of Human Rights', American Anthropologist, 108 (2006), 77-83. 
33 Michael C. Jensen, A Theory of the Firm. Governance, Residual Claims, and Organizational Forms 
(Harvard University Press, 2000). 
34 John Parkinson, 'Models of the Company and the Employment Relationship', British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 41 (2003), 481-509. 
35 Sanford Jacoby, 'Corporate Governance and Society', Challenge, 48 (2005), 69-87. 
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in corporate law’,36 namely the eventual triumph of the shareholder value theory. The 
financial and economic crisis since 2008 has done its part in challenging this credo. 
However, it is important to emphasize that what might be perceived as having been a 
dispute merely among corporate law scholars (and policy makers), had instead long 
become a forum with a much wider impact, as participants acknowledged the 
exemplary role of corporate governance for a timely and much needed scrutiny and 
critique of market regulation as such.37 What makes corporate governance such a 
promising example for the study of the prospects of comparative law, is the field’s 
enormous regulatory dynamism, which oscillates between national historical 
idiosyncrasies on the one hand and the extremely volatile impulses that it receives on 
a global scale, on the other. 
Corporate governance has to be seen in the context of a highly diversified 
series of transnational norm-setting processes resulting in a veritable explosion of 
corporate governance codes in Europe and elsewhere. With the proliferation of 
corporate governance codes, influenced and pushed by international and transnational 
activities of norm setting, discussion and thought exchange, it has become 
increasingly difficult to identify a single institution or author of a set of norms. 
Instead, much of the production and dissemination of corporate governance rules 
operates through the migration of standards and a cross-fertilisation of norms. A 
distinct feature of this de-territorialised production of norms is the radical challenge 
these processes pose for the way in which we distinguish between law proper and 
non-legal ‘norms’. The dissemination of corporate governance codes, disclosure 
standards and rules, best practices and codes of conduct, affects the entire juridical 
‘nexus of corporate governance’ as comprised of norms pertaining to company law, 
labour law and securities regulation,38 as the decentralisation of norm producers is 
repeated, mirrored and reflected in the hybridisation of the norms themselves. It is in 
this sense, that the study of the proliferation of corporate governance codes and 
company law production in general and of the rules of remuneration disclosure in 
particular feeds into a broader research inquiry into the changing face of legal 
regulation in globally integrated marketplaces. 
Against this background, corporate governance emerges today as a product of 
the fundamental transformations of regulatory instruments and institutions. As 
corporate law is being shaped by a complex mixture of public, private, state- and non-
state-based norms, principles and rules, generated, disseminated and monitored by a 
diverse set of actors,39 a closer look at this field can serve two purposes: one is the 
way in which the analysis of contemporary corporate governance regulation can help 
us to assess the emerging, new framework within which corporate governance, but 
also other rules of market regulation are evolving. Secondly, through the way in 
which we begin to understand this emerging transnational regulatory framework as an 
illustration of contemporary rule-making, the long-standing legal pluralist contention 
of formal and informal legal orders comes to be seen in a new light. This leads us to 
                                                
36 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, 'The End of History for Corporate Law', Georgetown Law 
Journal, 89 (2001), 439-468. 
37 See e.g. Peter A. Gourevitch and James Shinn, Political Power and Corporate Control. The New 
Global Politics of Corporate Governance (Princeton University Press, 2005); Peter A. Hall and David 
Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage 
(Oxford University Press, 2001). 
38 See John W. Cioffi, Public Law and Private Power: Corporate Governance Reform in the United 
States and Germany in an Age of Finance Capitalism (Cornell University Press, 2010). 
39 See also Arthurs R. Pinto, 'Globalization and the Study of Comparative Corporate Governance', 
Wisconsin International Law Journal, 23 (2005), 477. 
 8 
re-visit the core question of any sociology of law, namely, how “to investigate the 
correlations between law and other spheres of culture”.40 Expanding the spectrum 
with a view to legal pluralism might help us better understand the distinctly 
transnational emergence of regulatory regimes. The transnational lens allows us to 
study such regimes not as being entirely detached from national political and legal 
orders, but as both emerging from them and reaching beyond them. The transnational 
dimension of the new actors and the newly emerging forms of norms radicalizes their 
‘semi-autonomous’ nature, represented in the tension between a ‘formal’ law and 
policy making apparatus on the one hand and spontaneously evolving ‘informal’ 
norms in particular social contexts on the other.41 The development of corporate 
governance is thus an example of intricate, domestic and transnational, multi-level 
processes of norm generation and norm enforcement, which poses particular 
challenges for a study of comparative law traditionally focusing on national legal 
orders. The practical relevance in stressing this transnational nature consists in 
radically de-parochializing the traditional comparative corporate law focus on 
particular national company law forms in order to lay bare the transnational 
connections between local law reform, deregulation and privatization processes. From 
this perspective, comparative corporate governance takes the respective national 
histories seriously, but considers them in a transnational context of increasing market 
self-regulatory power and an ambivalent status of the state, which is more often than 




Human Rights Law and Transnational Anthropology: Unpacking Practice 
 
Guided by our interest in highlighting sites of transformation in traditional 
comparative law, the next example here considered is one where the relevance of a 
practical turn is perhaps even more pertinent than in the previous one. Human rights 
law has for the longest time been fraught with considerable tension existing between 
its highflying normative aspirations and its unbounded abstractness. The often 
cherished history of progress, redemption and alleviation has rightly been called into 
question,42 and what has emerged is a complex set of often intertwined and contested 
narratives and approaches towards human rights. Read against the background of an 
early relativist critique of human rights, ensuing attacks – focusing on gender 
blindness, structural (e.g. socio-economic) violence or colonial heritage – have helped 
in creating a discursive climate in which a relatively great number of euphemizing 
human rights assertions seems to be widely recognized as being out of step with 
                                                
40 E. Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law, (orig. published in German as 
Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts, 1913) (New York: Russell & Russell, 1962), pp. 486-506, 
“The Study of the living law”; G. Gurvitch, Sociology of Law, (orig. published in French as Problèmes 
de la sociologie du droit) (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1947); M. Rheinstein, “Review: Two 
Recent Books on Sociology of Law [reviewing Timasheff’s ‘Introduction’ and Gurvitch’s 
‘Elements’]”, Ethics, 51 (1941), 220-231, at 221-2. 
41 Sally Falk Moore, 'Law and Social Change: the semi-autonomous field as an appropriate subject of 
study', Law & Society Review, 7 (1973), 719-746; Julia Black and David Rouch, 'The development of 
global markets as rule-makers: engagement and legitimacy', Law and Financial Markets Review, 
(2008), 218-233. 
42 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999); Upendra Baxi, 'Global 
Development and Impoverishment', in Peter Cane and Mark Tushnet (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Legal Studies (Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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reality and politics. Coalescing through work in international law,43 international legal 
history,44 literary criticism,45 cultural theory,46 political sociology,47 and legal 
anthropology,48 we find an intricate, multi-layered discourse on the concept and the 
nature of human rights, which suggests a far more differentiated approach to the 
problems raised by human rights assertion and practice that seems to have been 
possible in earlier times. 
A crucial development of interest, especially in light of the here pursued 
research agenda to scrutinize the practical dimensions of comparative law, is the way 
in which new lines of inquiry are opened, due to the fact that scholars are actively 
pursuing and identifying sites of cross-disciplinary inquiry and shared concerns. Two 
developments seem highly promising in that regard: the emergence of the so-called 
New Legal Realism [NLR] and the increasingly influential field of ethnography of 
human rights law. The former is coined, in particular, by a progressive interest in 
making sense of two overlapping and co-evolving developments: one concerns the 
‘ironic turn’ of the legal realist legacy,49 opening – as it were – the gates not only for 
critical legal studies, critical race theory or ‘third world approaches to international 
law’ but also for conservatively minded undertakings such as ‘law & economics’50 or 
‘social norms theory.’51 The other development which NLR is interested in is the 
dramatic transformation of traditional, state-centred law-making: in response to the 
far reaching effects of privatization, deregulation and transnationalization of norm-
generation, NLR seeks to revive legal sociological and legal pluralist as well as 
empirical and clinical law approaches to further scrutinize the nature of the emerging 
normative order.52 The central gist in this approach is that its proponents pursue both 
a methodological and a political research program. Seeing how prior assertions of the 
public nature of private government can easily be converted into a politically opposed 
policy prescription, NLR scholars demand that we take a closer look at the formal 
assumptions which inform the recent embrace of societal self-regulation and the 
primacy of ‘norms’ over rules.53 It becomes obvious that a most important dimension 
of NLR’s approach is an engagement with practice in various forms. One, to be sure, 
                                                
43 Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-
1960 (Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures, 2002). 
44 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
45 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978). 
46 Arjun Appadurai, 'Disjuncture and Difference in the Global and Cultural Economy', Public Culture, 
2 (1990), 1-24. 
47 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, 'The Processes of Globalisation', Eurozine (2002) 
http://www.eurozine.com/pdf/2002-08-22-santos-en.pdf. 
48 Sally Engle Merry, 'Anthropology, Law, and Transnational Processes', Annual Review of 
Anthropology, 21 (1992), 357-379. 
49 Peer Zumbansen, 'Law After the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism and the Ironic Turn of 
Reflexive Law', American Journal of Comparative Law, 56 (2008), 769-805. 
50 Kerry Rittich, 'Functionalism and Formalism: Their latest Incarnations in Contemporary 
Development and Governance Debates', University of Toronto Law Journal, 55 (2005), 853-868, 857: 
“…both law and economics and critical legal studies are realist progeny.” 
51 See e.g. Richard H. McAdams, 'The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms', Michigan Law 
Review, 96 (1997), 338-433; see also Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms (Harvard University Press, 
2000). 
52 For an excellent exposition of the NLR agenda, see Gregory Shaffer and Victoria Nourse, 'Varieties 
of New Legal Realism: Can A New World Order Prompt A New Legal Theory?', Cornell Law Review, 
61 (2009), 61-137. 
53 Stewart Macaulay, 'Relational Contracts Floating on a Sea of Custom? Thoughts about the Ideas of 
Ian Macneil and Lisa Bernstein', Northwestern University Law Review, 94 (2000), 775-804 
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is a renewed interest in empirical legal studies, field work and the concrete study of 
norms in their regulatory context.54 
Meanwhile, human rights law has been receiving much critique in the context 
of its potential cooptation within the law & development program of the International 
Financial Institutions, above all the World Bank.55 A particularly powerful 
contribution to this critique has been mobilized by anthropologists, who have been 
arguing against unwarranted assumptions regarding the value and the success of 
human rights norms, criticizing that such assertions often occur without sufficiently 
taking into account the concrete contextual circumstances.56 In this vein, human rights 
lawyers have – in continuation of earlier suggestions57 - emphasized the need and the 
promise of a more empirically based, field work oriented human rights scholarship.58  
 
Easier said than done? The currently burgeoning literature on this issue is regularly 
based on extensive field work, which seems to suggest that the wind may be in the 
sails for the ambitious undertaking to bring human rights law onto the ground of 
societal practice. The next step to further enhance the practical relevance of this 
engagement between human rights lawyers and anthropologists will likely be to 
continue the efforts of further approximating the methodological and normative 
starting points from which the respective experts embark on their collaboration. The 
great variances in human rights understandings and the need to expose and explore 
these potentials for misunderstanding are further exacerbated by the fact that the 
spaces in which this much-needed collaboration between human rights lawyers and 
anthropologists themselves constitute highly volatile and treacherous territory. As the 
human rights/anthropology collaboration often enough occurs in the context of funded 
development (or, transitional justice) projects there is an even greater need to make 
both assumptions and expectations explicit and to collectively pursue a continued 
improvement of the methodological toolkit, with which we may measure the ‘success’ 
of human rights development. The recent scrutiny of the World Bank’s Indicators 
program is a powerful illustration of the challenges at hand.59 
 
 
Comparative Constitutional Law and Constitutionalism: Pipe-Dream or Prophecy? 
                                                
54 Gregory Shaffer and Mark A. Pollack, 'Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements and 
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David Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds.), The New Law and Economic Development. A Critical 
Appraisal (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
56 Sally Engle Merry, 'New Legal Realism and the Ethnography of Transnational Law', Law & Social 
Inquiry, 31 (2006), 975-995. 
57 Annelise Riles, 'Anthropology, Human Rights, and Legal Knowledge: Culture in the Iron Cage', 
American Anthropologist, 108 (2006), 52-65; Douglas R. Holmes and George E. Marcus, 'Cultures of 
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Ong and S J. Collier (eds.), Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological 
Problems (Malden, Oxford, Carlton: Blackwell Publishing, 2005). 
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Law', in Mark Goodale and Sally Engle Merry (eds.), The Practice of Human Rights: Tracking Law 
Between the Global and the Local (Cambridge University Press, 2006); Carol Greenhouse, 'Fieldwork 
on Law', Annual Review of Law and Social Sciences, (2006), 187-210. 
59 Sally Engle Merry, 'Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights, and Global Governance', in 




Let us turn to our next example. Underlying the thriving field of comparative 
constitutional law is the assumption that we can (still) readily distinguish between 
‘different systems’ and that it is indeed possible to reach even deeper within them in 
order to assess and interpret recognizable differences in the design, practice and 
culture of constitutional design. Much suggests, however, that the foundations on 
which we can base the identification and demarcation of distinct constitutional 
systems builds more on historic than on systematic evidence. In other words, we need 
to ask whether or not the increasing ‘migration of constitutional ideas’,60 the 
phenomenon of ‘judicial globalization’61 and the impregnation of constitutional 
cultures through ‘foreign’ norms and principles,62 which reflect on a considerable 
degree of transformation, opening and ‘internationalization’, still leaves the traditional 
comparative structure intact of comparing distinct legal cultures.63 Just as comparative 
law in general, constitutional comparisons, too, are still plagued by a great degree of 
methodological uncertainty and theoretical indeterminacy. But, while 
“[c]onstitutionalism is sweeping the world”,64 evidenced for example by “at least 110 
countries around the world” engaged in constitution writing or reform since 1990,65 at 
a closer look this evidence is itself extremely varied. Both causes and forms of 
constitutional change are anything but uniform and thus belie all claims regarding a 
world-wide and universal trend to a specific set of constitutional values or rights. 
Rather, the intensity of constitutional creation, reform and discourse around the world 
is illustrative of the complexity of this process. The search, thus, for an analytical 
architecture of typologies across these myriad and continuously evolving 
constitutionalist cultures must reach deep into the constitutive elements of legal and 
political cultures, where the places, forms and scopes of democracy continue to be 
‘unsolved riddles.’66 
The success of a practice of comparative constitutional law largely depends on 
the degree to which it becomes possible to embrace a broader, if not an alternative 
understanding of the nexus between the ‘constitution’ and an institutionalized legal-
political order. The emergence of a transnational legal-pluralist order alluded to above 
can be seen as a next stage in the theorizing of comparative law. For constitutional 
law, this emerging transnational order underscores the necessity of looking for the 
constitution ‘outside’ the constitution,67 that is to track constitutional norms in those 
                                                
60 Sujit Choudhry (ed.) The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
61 Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'Judicial Globalization', Virginia Journal of International Law, 40 (2000), 
1103-1124. 
62 Gérard V. La Forest, 'The Expanding Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in International Law 
Issues', Canadian Yearbook of International Law, 34 (1996), 89; Louise Arbour and Fannie Lafontaine, 
'Beyond Self-Congratulation: The Charter at 25 in an International Perspective', Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal, 45 (2007), 239-275. 
63 But see: Sujit Choudhry, 'Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative 
Constitutional Interpretation', Indiana Law Journal, (1999), 819-948, 941: “A court’s choice of 
interpretive methodology will affect more than the outcome the particular case before it. It will also 
likely affect the broader constitutional culture of the interpreting court’s jurisdiction.” 
64 Susan H. Williams, 'Introduction: Comparative Constitutional Law, Gender Equality, and 
Constitutional Design', in Susan H. Williams (ed.) Constituting Equality. Gender Equality and 
Comparative Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 1. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Susan Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions. International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of 
Ideology (Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 103, 146.  
67 See eg Ernest A. Young, 'The Constitution outside the Constitution', Yale Law Journal, 117 (2007), 
408-473, and already Robert M. Cover, 'Nomos and Narrative', Harvard Law Review, 97 (1983), 4-68. 
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regulatory structures, where questions of legitimacy are at stake. Comparative 
constitutional law scholars have begun to embrace such a broader understanding of 
their field by adopting the term of ‘constitutionalism’.68 Through this lens, a 
constitutional scholar might recognize the evolution of a transnational culture of 
constitutionalism. When speaking of transnational constitutionalism, we should not 
think of a normative order that emerges autonomously outside of the confines of the 
nation state and, as such encompasses a distinct space of global governance with no 
relation to the world of states and the correlating measurements of law, namely 
national and international. Instead, transnational constitutionalism expresses the 
continuing evolution of constitutional principles, instruments and doctrines as a 
particular form of legal evolution today. Transnational constitutionalism radically 
challenges but does not negate the distinction between the domestic and the 
international legal order. Again, to reiterate Jessup’s emphasis of a transnational legal 
order, the idea of ‘transnational law’ could aptly capture the emergence of norm 
creation and enforcement outside of the confines of both private and public 
international law.69 Central to the ensuing projects, prominently in the theoretical and 
conceptual work around legal pluralism,70 human rights law71 and transnational legal 
theory,72 are two insights, one relating to the overwhelming evidence of norm creation 
which occurs outside of the state’s law-making apparatus,73 the other one connected 
to a particular understanding of law’s relation to society, where society is understood 
to be one ‘without centre or apex’.74 In such a society, the state represents a particular 
emblematic form of political organization the emergence (and fate) of which is 
historically embedded and thus contingent. That the centre (or, the top) of societies 
should be occupied by the state is – thus – both historically and geographically 
variable.  
While the consequences for traditional comparative law are substantial, there 
is today prolific evidence of comparative constitutional studies ‘in action’, as long as 
courts stick to comparing elements taken from distinct public law regimes and 
constitutional orders. Courts around the world – with differing degrees of deference75 
– have long been engaged in practiced comparison, as they consider drawing on 
                                                
68 Norman Dorsen, Michel Rosenfeld, András Sajó and Susanne Baer, Comparative Constitutionalism. 
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242. 
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Nebraska Law Review, 75 (1996), 181-206. 
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Comparative Law (Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2006). 
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74 Niklas Luhmann, Political Theory in the Welfare State [1981, transl. by John Bednarz Jr.] (de 
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75 Consider the ‘controversy over citation’, Dorsen et al, supra, 6 ff; see also the discussion of the 
‘living constitution’ and the ‘constitution as living tree’ metaphors in Vicki C. Jackson, 'Constitutions 
as 'Living Trees'? Comparative Constitutional Law and Interpretive Metaphors', Fordham Law Review, 
75 (2006), 921-960, 941 ff. 
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alternative, ‘foreign’ viewpoints in preparing and rendering their decisions.76 In that 
practice, ‘foreign’ constitutional law is seen as both a guidance to local decision-
making and as a ‘work of art’.77  
But, the reference points for comparative constitutional law begin to lapse – 
both internally within the nation state and beyond. The current phase of globalization 
is marked by a far-reaching change in the position and status of states and sovereign 
political actors. The changes brought about for statehood since the second World War, 
through decolonization and regionalization, reunification and emancipation78 have 
drastically changed the anchoring and reference points for comparative constitutional 
studies: “The transformation of statehood shatters the former unity of territory, power, 
and people, and challenges the constitution’s ability comprehensively to encompass 
the political entity of the state.”79 From the perspective, then, of the constitution’s 
close association of the constitution and constitutionalism with the state, the prospects 
of comparative constitutional law seem to be tightly connected to the fate of 
comparative law in a globalized world, where the contours of statehood have become 
porous.80 Arguably, the relevance of the concept of ‘constitutionalism’ – as opposed 
to ‘constitution’ – lies in its potential to build bridges between the constitutional law 
discourses within the nation state and the investigations into legitimacy of global 
governance in the ‘post-national constellation.’81 
Another development in transnational law making is of great significance in 
assessing the prospects of comparative constitutional law. The ‘emergence of private 
authority in global governance’82 – as expressed in a variety of areas83 including 
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standardization84 and the lex mercatoria85 - constitutes a considerable challenge for 
constitutional thought. These regulatory regimes in the transnational arena reflect, on 
the one hand, on a fundamentally changed role of the state in the exercise of ‘public’ 
authority86, the origins of which have to be seen, firstly, in a transformation of the 
inter-national context87 and in the inner-state shift ‘from government to 
governance.’88 Secondly, these changes are associated with the emergence of norm-
making processes, institutions of rule creation, implementation and adjudication 
which scholars are struggling to fully scrutinize. Negotiating their allegedly 
‘autonomous’ nature89 ‘without’90 or ‘beyond’91 the state, legal scholars, political 
philosophers and sociologists are equally faced with the following question: “Is 
constitutional theory able to generalize the ideas it developed for the nation state and 
to re-specify them for today’s problems? In other words, can we make the tradition of 
nation-state constitutionalism fruitful and redesign it in order to cope with phenomena 
of privatization and globalization?”92 
Such questions unfold against the background of the two contexts of 
transformation – the international and the national one. That the field of comparative 
(constitutional) law, despite pertinent enterprises to scrutinize its methodological 
foundations,93 still lacks satisfactory theoretization, has been remarked by scholars all 
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around.94 More importantly and substantively more fruitfully, scholars have 
highlighted the importance of a forceful engagement with the methodological 
challenges arising from any comparative legal project today.95 Connecting the current 
inquiry in comparative constitutionalism with the observations made above with 
regard to human rights ethnography, the next step must be to bring together the 
evolving understanding of an emerging transnational legal-pluralist order with the 
insights into the necessity of grounding abstract concepts of any form of rights and 
legal regulation in concrete societal contexts. From this perspective, it would be 
necessary, in a first step, to make explicit the different starting points and background 
assumptions concerning the elements of a constitutional order considered crucial. In a 
second step it would be necessary to take into view the manifold manifestations of 
‘rights’ talk as they occur after or around far reaching political turmoil. A 
characteristic of this reference to rights is that it occurs more often than not without 
rights themselves being mentioned because participants employ highly varied forms 
of legal semantics through which they hope to gain an ‘access to justice’. The 
practical relevance of comparative constitutional law would reveal itself in the ability 
to lay bare different forms in which constitutional claims break through and come to 
the fore, often enough in non easily recognized ‘constitutional’ parlance, but in 
idiosyncratic, context specific and local language. The work, for example, on 
‘globalization from below’96 or on ‘transnational labor citizenship’97 can be seen as 
providing instantiations of constitutional law in action, without there being an overly 
explicit emphasis on the constitutional nature of the legal regime at question. At the 
same time, it is important to keep in mind that such a non-traditionalist look at the 
lingering constitutional forces ‘beneath the ground’ is in no way privy recent 
ethnographic or legal pluralist scholarly endeavors alone. Quite to the contrary, 
progressive scholars had long fostered an awareness of those constitutional forces ‘in 
the dark’, or as being outside of regular constitutional doctrine.98 It is a well known 
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The last example chosen here to explore the potential of a ‘turn to practice’ in 
comparative law is prompted by the recently emerged scholarly activity focusing on 
so-called Global Administrative Law [GAL].100 While this ambitious research project 
has met with both interest and considerable skepticism,101 one particular trait has not – 
to my knowledge – been made part of extensive scrutiny. This concerns the project’s 
surprising lack of a comparative basis as regards countries’ administrative law 
doctrine. Born out of a serendipitous collaboration between two public lawyers 
educated in the common law and a young civil law scholar, GAL nevertheless shows 
very little if any traces of this background – neither within the founding group of 
scholars nor in the intellectual basis of the project itself. As a research project with a 
global aspiration, focusing above all on the troubling insufficiencies in global 
democratic governance, as instantiated by the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund or the World Trade Organization, the request, hinted at here, for the project to 
incorporate a comprehensive comparative agenda might simply be ill-directed. At the 
same time, it gives pause to think that a project with such far reaching scope can be 
conceived in near to complete isolation of the historical-intellectual contexts in which 
the very concepts, which are now at the centre of the project – participation, 
transparency and judicial review102 – have their origin. If we considered, for a 
moment, the striking coincidence of, say, the publication of two important writings in 
both the US American and the German administrative law sciences, in 1938,103 we 
would perhaps become tempted to dig deeper. Such digging might in fact not only 
reveal the background assumptions of GAL as (whose?) administrative law ‘goes 
global’, but it could also go a long way in helping us understand the potential of 
bringing the hidden histories of a particular legal field to light, as they feed into the 
conceptualization on a world scale.  
Given the different histories and narratives that inform national 
understandings of administrative law, with which we embark on any comparison of 
administrative regimes or, with which we begin to address the regulatory challenges 
posed by international organizations under the rubric ‘Global Administrative Law’, 
we should have a closer look at both the available instruments in comparative law and 
the subject matter – administrative law – itself. Close readings of national narratives 
of administrative governance reveal particular connotations of regulatory power and 
of the relationship between different institutions (legislature, executive, judiciary and 
administrative agencies).104 What emerges of such side-by-side inspections of national 
narratives, is that particular assessments of administrative governance are based on a 
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particular understanding of the relationship between state and society, between public 
and private and between citizen and state.105 
This is powerfully exemplified by the understanding of the public-private 
distinction with regard to the nature of the administrative process. One could argue, 
from an Anglo-American perspective that conceptions of the administrative process in 
the 1930s would serve to free up space for reform projects from the stronghold of 
legalistic control and judicial review. Here, the critique of a concept, based on which 
regulation of an otherwise self-regulating market would happen through general 
principles, eventually promoted the view that not courts, but rather highly educated 
and flexible administrative actors could effectively “handle the regulatory problems of 
a complex, interdependent, industrial society.”106 The attention shifted towards a 
political assessment of this ‘scientific’ expertise and was soon complemented by an 
emphasis on the use of administrative action to promote social justice, a task for 
which courts were seen to be insufficiently sensitive.107  
In contrast to this we find a somewhat different concept in German 
administrative law. In the latter, the public-private distinction would for the longest 
time shape an understanding of the state resting on top of society and in constant 
danger of being captured by diverse, powerful societal interests. This image of society 
as beleaguering and eventually consummating the state was powerfully painted again 
in 1938 by Carl Schmitt’s LEVIATHAN (1938) and by one of Schmitt’s master pupils, 
the constitutional historian and administrative law scholar, Ernst Forsthoff, who 
published in the same year his succinct proposal for a responsible and powerful state 
to assume responsibility for administering the needs of society, in “Der Staat der 
Daseinsvorsorge”.108 Certainly, administrative law in Germany had already for a long 
time been losing its innocence and elevated status vis-à-vis society through the ever 
increasing regulation of an industrializing society and, subsequently, a war economy. 
Debates among German administrative lawyers over the state of their discipline 
became heated as they would always unfold with close links to reflections over the 
sovereignty of state rule.  
To be sure, ‘total state’ thinking109 remained an extreme position in German 
public law thinking.110 A consequence drawn in German legal scholarship after 1945 
was to demand that all administrative action be placed under close scrutiny by 
courts.111 The protection of the individual citizen from acts by the government was 
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considered essential. The eventually emerging welfare state orientation in German 
public law, arising out of an amalgamation of growing regulatory demands in areas 
such as environmental law but also in labor and social law, brought about a subtle 
shift in the law’s orientation.  
In a conservative tradition, a formalist rule of law concept of the Bonn 
Republic after 1949 had to be defended against the contentions of the social and 
welfare state, a debate which found its temporary climax during the 1952 German 
public lawyers association meeting, triggering the so-called Forsthoff-Abendroth 
debate that focused on the constitutionality under the German Basic Law to codify 
social rights.112 Well into the 1970s, thus, administrative law remained within a 
conservative ambit. In short, it remained a field for public lawyers, mandated with the 
elaboration and consolidation of reliable rules for the resolution of difficult regulatory 
problems. The state and its the administrative agencies were still being understood 
and conceptualized as institutionally and normatively removed from civil society. The 
resulting, somewhat impoverished concept of society present in German social theory 
might have been captured perfectly by Jürgen Habermas, who remarked that for the 
longest time ‘society’ has been available only as a deduced concept, which had no 
definition of its own, but had to be seen as resulting from subtraction from the state.113 
As already alluded to with respect to the emerging regulatory demands of a fast 
economically and dramatically industrializing post-war society, it was quickly 
perceived that the administration would inevitably play an important role within the 
new regulatory paradigm.114 Methodologically, this is most powerfully expressed in 
the shift from conditional planning to a final, goal-oriented planning paradigm. While 
politics formulated the orientation of governmental action, it was left to the 
administration to choose the appropriate means to pursue these goals.115 
Taking even a cursory comparative view on the administrative law 
developments in Germany and in the United States reveals thus a host of striking 
similarities, many of which are owed to the crisis of formalism that accompanied the 
increase of public regulation in more and more areas of societal life.116 The critique of 
‘classical legal thought’,117 unfolded in both countries with great strength. The 
involvement of the state in many areas of societal life lead to the emergence of new 
fields of administrative law (e.g. ‘social law’ encompassing workmen’s insurance etc; 
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communal law, taxation law, labor law etc). The thriving of administrative science led 
one of the major leading German administrative lawyers to remark in 1924, that 
“constitutional laws pass, administrative law stays.”118 Erich Kaufmann, one of the 
central figures in the public law debate during the Weimar Republic, remarked 
fittingly: “In this development there is no return to the classic administrative state.”119 
What can be seen then through a comparative lens is that the critique of 
formalism as it unfolded in the U.S. American context around the work of James 
Landis unfolded with a political thrust that was on the other end of the spectrum than 
that which accompanied the strengthening of the administrative branch in Germany: 
Landis's progressive rescue of administrative governance is juxtaposed to Forsthoff's 
liberation of a conservative bureaucracy from parliamentary and judicial oversight. 
Indeed, the interesting feature of such a comparison is that the respective turn away 
from formalism, which accompanied the rise of welfare state regimes in both 
countries remains embedded and can adequately be explained only with reference to 
the particular political economy of “state and society” and its practical and symbolic 
power in each respective legal and socio-economic culture. In short, then, a 
comparative study of state and society in Germany and in the United States reveals a 
marked contrast in the way in which lawyers did elaborate legal concepts in relation 
to their understanding of state and society. In turning its attention to the recent 
decades, such a comparative administrative history would have to ask questions 
regarding the different or similar experiences in welfare state reform, privatization 
and internationalization. Against this background, the distinct starting points and 
trajectories of administrative governance experiences would become visible. 
With regard to the ambitious project of conceptualizing a global 
administrative law, such a glance at the legal and intellectual history of governance 
ideas reveals a considerable degree of complexity in the respective trajectories of 
national administrative law traditions. As GAL continues to become more 
sophisticated, not least due to the impulses and critique it receives from different 
sides, most prominently perhaps critical international law scholarship120 and the Third 
World Approaches to International Law,121 its current blindness to national 
administrative law histories will need to be addressed – sooner rather than later. The 
still outstanding face-to-face dialogue and reciprocal engagement between the original 
GAL concept on the one hand and the ‘Public Authority’ project under the auspices of 
the Max Planck Institute for International Law in Heidelberg,122 on the other, is telling 
in that regard. Meanwhile, some of its most insightful critics have been pointing to the 
ghosts in the architecture, forcefully bringing to light the problematic tensions 
between a de-nationalized construction of an administrative governance framework 
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In trying to elaborate on the tension between theory and practice in comparative law, 
this chapter has, in exemplary fashion, focused on four areas that offer valuable 
insights into the conceptual value and practicality of currently pursued comparative 
law projects. In light of the inseparability of the conceptual foundations of each 
project from its practical dimensions, I want to argue for a bolder consideration of 
‘what is at stake’ in each of these projects. The examples alluded to above – 
comparative corporate governance, human rights and legal anthropology, comparative 
constitutionalism and global administrative law – all have in common that they are 
key intellectual endeavors in the present global governance discourse. While ‘global 
governance’ still provokes considerable excitement as a term allegedly in need of a 
definition – something well known from the most recent surge in ‘globalization 
studies’ since the early 1990s – the caravan has clearly moved on. Global governance 
is as much a reality as it is a semantical construction. One way to unpack its many 
dimensions in a very practical and political manner would be to mobilize from the 
ground up the many comparative stories, which are at this point still strangely 
neglected in the rush into the global space. 
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